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Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. These are examples that have
undergone small, carefully crafted perturbations, and which can easily fool a DNN into making misclassifications at test time. Thus far,
the field of adversarial research has mainly focused on image models, under either a white-box setting, where an adversary has full
access to model parameters, or a black-box setting where an adversary can only query the target model for probabilities or labels.
Whilst several white-box attacks have been proposed for video models, black-box video attacks are still unexplored. To close this gap,
we propose the first black-box video attack framework, called V-BAD. V-BAD utilizes tentative perturbations transferred from image
models, and partition-based rectifications found by the NES on partitions (patches) of tentative perturbations, to obtain good
adversarial gradient estimates with fewer queries to the target model. V-BAD is equivalent to estimating the projection of an adversarial
gradient on a selected subspace. Using three benchmark video datasets, we demonstrate that V-BAD can craft both untargeted and
targeted attacks to fool two state-of-the-art deep video recognition models. For the targeted attack, it achieves >93% success rate
using only an average of 3.4 ∼ 8.4× 104 queries, a similar number of queries to state-of-the-art black-box image attacks. This is
despite the fact that videos often have two orders of magnitude higher dimensionality than static images. We believe that V-BAD is a
promising new tool to evaluate and improve the robustness of video recognition models to black-box adversarial attacks.
Index Terms—Adversarial examples, video recognition, black-box attack, model security.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP Neural Networks (DNNs) are a family of powerfulmodels that have demonstrated superior performance
in a wide range of visual understanding tasks that has been
extensively studied in both the multimedia and computer
vision communities such as video recognition[1], [2], [3],
[4], image classification[5], [6] and video captioning[7], [8].
Despite their current success, DNNs have been found to be
extremely vulnerable to adversarial examples (or attacks)
[9], [10]. For DNN classifiers, adversarial examples can be
easily generated by applying adversarial perturbations to
clean (normal) samples, that maximize the classification
error [10], [11], [12]. For images, the perturbations are often
small and visually imperceptible to human observers, but
they can fool DNNs into making misclassifications with
high confidence. The vulnerability of DNNs to adversar-
ial examples has raised serious security concerns for their
deployment in security-critical applications, such as face
recognition [13] and self-driving cars[14]. Hence, the study
of adversarial examples for DNNs has become a crucial task
for secure deep learning.
Adversarial examples can be generated by an attack
method (also called an adversary) following either a white-
box setting (white-box attacks) or a black-box setting (black-
box attacks). In the white-box setting, an adversary has full
access to the target model (the model to attack), including
model parameters and training settings. In the black-box
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setting, an adversary only has partial information about the
target model, such as the labels or probabilities output by
the model. White-box methods generate an adversarial ex-
ample by applying one step or multiple steps perturbations
on a clean test sample, following the direction of the ad-
versarial gradient [10], [12]. The adversarial gradient is the
gradient of an adversarial loss, which is typically defined to
maximize (rather than minimize) classification error. How-
ever, in the black-box setting, adversarial gradients are not
accessible to an adversary. In this case, the adversary can
first attack a local surrogate model and then transfer these
attacks to the target model [15], [16], [17]. Alternatively they
may use a black-box optimization method such as Finite
Differences (FD) or Natural Evolution Strategies (NES), to
estimate the gradient [18], [19], [20].
A number of attack methods have been proposed [11],
[12], [21], however, most of them focus on either image
models, or video models but in a white-box setting [22],
[23]. Different from these works, in this paper, we propose a
framework for the generation of adversarial attacks against
video recognition models, specifically in a black-box setting.
Significant progress has been achieved for black-box image
attacks, but not for black-box video attacks. A key reason
is that videos typically have much higher dimensionality
(often two magnitudes higher) than static images. On static
images, for most attacks to succeed, existing black-box
methods must use ∼ 104 queries [18], [20] on CIFAR-10 [24]
images, and ∼ 105 queries [19] on ImageNet [25] images.
Due to their massive input dimensions, black-box attacks
on videos generally require two orders of magnitude more
queries for gradient estimation than are needed for images.
This makes black-box video attacks impractical, taking into
account time and budget constraints. To better evaluate
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Fig. 1: An example of black-box video adversarial attacks
(targeted). The original video (top) can be correctly recog-
nized while the adversarial one (bottom) generated by our
proposed method is misclassified by the same video model.
the robustness of video models, it is therefore important
to explore efficient black-box methods that can generate
attacks using fewer queries.
In this paper, we propose a simple and efficient frame-
work for the generation of black-box adversarial attacks on
video recognition models. Intuitively, we exploit the trans-
ferability of adversarial perturbations and the derivative-
free optimization methods to obtain accurate estimations
of the adversarial gradients. In particular, we first generate
tentative perturbations as a rough estimate of the true adver-
sarial gradient using ImageNet-pretrained DNNs. We then
rectify these tentative perturbations in patches (or partitions)
using NES, by querying the target model. Our proposed
framework only needs to estimate a small number of di-
rectional derivatives (of the patches) rather than estimating
pixel-wise derivatives, making it an efficient framework for
black-box video attacks. Figure 1 shows an example of video
adversarial attacks generated by our proposed method. In
summary, our main contributions are:
• We study the problem of black-box attacks on video
recognition models and propose a general frame-
work called V-BAD, to generate black-box video
adversarial examples. To the best of our knowledge,
our proposed framework V-BAD is the first black-
box adversarial attack framework for videos.
• Our proposed framework V-BAD exploits both the
transferability of adversarial perturbations via the
use of tentative perturbations, and the advantages
of gradient estimation via NES for patch-level recti-
fication of the tentative perturbations. We also show
that V-BAD is equivalent to estimating the projection
of the adversarial gradient on a selected subspace.
• We conduct an empirical evaluation using three
benchmark video datasets and two state-of-the-art
video recognition models. We show that V-BAD can
achieve high attack success rates with few queries
to target models, making it a useful tool for the
robustness evaluation of video models.
2 RELATED WORK
White-box Image Attack. The fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) crafts an adversarial example by perturbing a nor-
mal sample along the gradient direction towards maxi-
mizing the classification error [10]. FGSM is a single-step
attack, and can be applied iteratively to improve adversar-
ial strength [13]. Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [21] is
another iterative method that is regarded as the strongest
first-order attack. PGD projects the perturbations back onto
the -ball centered at the original sample when perturba-
tions go beyond the -ball. The C&W attack solves the
attack problem via an optimization framework [12], and
is arguably the state-of-the-art white-box attack. There also
exists other types of white-box methods, e.g., Jacobian-based
Saliency Map Attack (JSMA) [26], DeepFool [27] and elastic-
net attack (EAD) [28].
Black-box Image Attack. In the black-box setting, the
adversarial gradients are not directly accessible by an ad-
versary. As such, black-box image attacks either exploit
the transferability of adversarial examples (also known as
transferred attacks) or make use of gradient estimation tech-
niques. It was first observed in [9] that adversarial examples
are transferable across models, even if the models have
different architectures or were trained separately. [17] trains
a surrogate model locally on synthesized data, with labels
obtained by querying the target model. It then generates
adversarial examples from the surrogate model using white-
box methods to attack the target model. However, training
a surrogate model on synthesized data often incurs a huge
number of queries, and the transferability of generated
adversarial examples is often limited. [20] proposes the use
of Finite Differences (FD), a black-box gradient estimation
method, to estimate the adversarial gradient. [18] accel-
erates FD-based gradient estimation with dimensionality
reduction techniques such as PCA. Compared to FD, [19]
demonstrates improved performance with fewer queries by
the use of the other type of gradient estimation method
called Natural Evolutionary Strategies (NES).
White-box Video Attack. In contrast to image adver-
sarial examples, much less work has been done for video
adversarial examples. White-box video attacks were first
investigated in [29], which discussed the sparsity and prop-
agation of adversarial perturbations across video frames.
[22] leverages Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
to perturb each frame in real-time video classification. In
this paper, we explore black-box attacking methods against
state-of-the-art video recognition models, which, to the best
of our knowledge, is the first work on black-box video
attacks.
Video Recognition Models. Encouraged by the great
success of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) on im-
age recognition tasks, many works propose to adapt image
(2D) CNNs to video recognition. [1] explores various ap-
proaches for extending 2D CNNs to video recognition based
on features extracted from individual frames. CNN+LSTM
based models [30], [31] exploit the temporal information
contained in successive frames, with recurrent layers cap-
turing long term dependencies on top of CNNs. C3D[2],
[32], [33] extends the 2D spatio-only filters in traditional
CNNs to 3D spatio-temporal filters for videos, and learn
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Fig. 2: Overview of the proposed V-BAD framework for black-box video attacks.
hierarchical spatio-temporal representations directly from
videos. However, C3D models often have a huge number of
parameters, which makes training difficult. To address this,
[3] proposes the Inflated 3D ConvNet(I3D) with Inflated
2D filters and pooling kernels of traditional 2D CNNs. In
this paper, we use two representative state-of-the-art video
recognition models, CNN+LSTM and I3D, as our target
models to attack.
3 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK V-BAD
3.1 Preliminaries
We denote a video sample by x ∈ X ⊂ RN×H×W×C with
N , H , W , C denoting the number of frames, frame height,
frame width, and the number of channels respectively, and
its associated true class by y ∈ Y = {1, · · · ,K}. Video
recognition is to learn a DNN classifier f(x; θ) : X → Y
by minimizing the classification loss `(f(x; θ), y), and θ
denotes the parameters of the network. When the context
is clear, we abbreviate f(x; θ) as f(x), and `(f(x; θ), y)
as `(x, y). The goal of adversarial attack is to find an
adversarial example xadv that can fool the network to make
a false prediction, while keeping the adversarial example
xadv within the adv-ball centered at the original example x
(‖xadv − x‖p ≤ adv). Following early works [19], [21], [34],
[35], [36], in this paper, we only focus on the L∞-norm, that
is, ‖xadv − x‖∞ ≤ adv , but our framework also applies to
other norms.
There are two types of adversarial attacks: untargeted
attack and targeted attack. Untargeted attack is to find an
adversarial example that can be misclassified as any class
other than the correct one (e.g. f(xadv) 6= y), while targeted
attack is to find an adversarial example that can be misclas-
sified as a targeted adversarial class (e.g. f(xadv) = yadv
and yadv 6= y). For simplicity, we denote the adversarial loss
function that should be optimized to find an adversarial ex-
ample by `adv(x), and let `adv(x) = −`(x, y) for untargeted
attack and `adv(x) = `(x, yadv) for targeted attack. We also
denote the adversarial gradient of the adversarial loss to the
input as g = ∇x`adv(x). Accordingly, an attacking method
is to minimize the adversarial loss `adv(x) by iteratively
perturbing the input sample following the direction of the
adversarial gradient g.
Threat Model. Our threat model follows the query-
limited black-box setting as follows. The adversary takes the
video classifier f as a black-box oracle and only has access
to its output of the top 1 score. More specifically, during
the attack process, given an arbitrary clean sample x, the
adversary can query the target model f to obtain the top 1
label yˆ and its probability P (yˆ|x). The adversary is asked to
generate attacks within Q number of queries. We consider
both untargeted and targeted black-box attacks.
3.2 Framework Overview
The structure of the proposed framework, namely V-BAD,
for black-box video attacks is illustrated in Figure 2. Follow-
ing steps (a)-(e) highlighted in the figure, V-BAD perturbs an
input video iteratively as follow: (a) It passes video frames
into a public image model (such as ImageNet-pretrained
networks) to obtain pixel-wise tentative perturbations h; (b)
It then partitions pixel-wise tentative perturbations into
a set of M patches U (U = [u(1),u(2), ...,u(M)] where
u(m) represents the m-th patch); (c) A black-box gradient
estimator estimates the weight (e.g. vˆm = ∂`adv∂u(m) ) to each
patch for rectification (or correction), via querying the target
video model; (d) The patch-wise rectification weights are
applied on the patches to obtain the rectified pixel-wise per-
turbations gˆ; (e) Apply one step PGD update on the input
video, according to the rectified perturbations gˆ. Specifically,
the proposed method at the t-th PGD perturbation step can
be described as:
v = 0 (1)
ht = φ(xt−1) (2)
U = G(ht) (3)
vˆ = v +∇v`adv(xt−1 +R(v,U)) (4)
gˆ = R(vˆ,U) (5)
xt = Π(x
t−1 − α · sign(gˆ)) (6)
where, xt−1 is the adversarial example generated at step
t − 1, φ(·) is the function to extract tentative perturbations
4(e.g. ht), G(·) is a partitioning method that splits pixels of
ht into a set of patches U, vˆ is the estimated rectification
weights for patches in U via a black-box gradient estimator,
R(v,U) is a rectification function that applies patch-wise
rectifications vˆ to patches in U to obtain pixel-wise rectified
perturbations (e.g. gˆ), Π(·) is a projection operation, sign(·)
is the sign function, α is the PGD step size,  is the per-
turbaiton bound. R(v,U) applies the rectification weights
to patches, thus enables us to estimate the gradients with
respect to the patches in place of the gradients with respect
to the raw pixels, which reduces the dimension of attack
space from RN×H×W×C to RM where M is the number of
patches. Each of the above operations will be explained in
the following sections.
Targeted V-BAD Attack. For a targeted attack, we need
to ensure that the target class remains in the top-1 classes
during the attacking process, as the score of the target
class is required for gradient estimation. Thus, instead of
the original sample x, we begin with a sample from the
target class (e.g. x0 = x′ and f(x′) = yadv), then gradually
(step by step) reduce the perturbations bound  from 1 (for
normalized inputs x ∈ [0, 1]) to adv while maintaining the
targeted class as the top-1 class. Note that although we begin
with x0 = x′, the adversarial example is bounded within the
adv-ball centered at the original example x. The targeted V-
BAD attack is described in Algorithm 1. We use an epsilon
decay ∆ to control the reduction size of the perturbation
bound. The epsilon decay ∆ and PGD step size α are
dynamically adjusted as described in 4.1.
Untargeted V-BAD Attack. For untargeted attack, we
use the original clean example as our starting point: x0 = x,
where x is the original clean example. And the perturbation
bound  is set to the constant adv throughout the attacking
process.
3.3 Tentative Perturbations
Tentative perturbations refer to initialized pixel-wise adver-
sarial perturbations, generated each time before rectification
from image models. This corresponds to the function φ(·) in
Eq. (2). As PGD only needs the sign of adversarial gradient
to perturb a sample, here we also take the sign value of the
generated perturbations as the tentative perturbations.
Here, we discuss three types of tentative perturbations.
1) Random: the perturbation for each input dimension takes
on the value 1 or -1 equiprobably. Random perturbations
only provide a stochastic exploration of the input space,
which can be extremely inefficient due to the massive input
dimensions of videos. 2) Static: the perturbation for each
input dimension is fixed to 1. Fixed perturbations impose
a strong constraint on the exploration space, with the same
tentative perturbations used for each gradient estimation.
3) Transferred: tentative perturbations can alternatively be
transferred from off-the-shelf pre-trained image models.
Since natural images share certain similar patterns, image
adversarial examples often transfer across models or do-
mains, though the transferability can be limited and will
vary depending on the content of the images. To better
exploit such transferability for videos, we propose to white-
box attack a pre-trained image model such as an ImageNet
pre-trained DNN, in order to extract the tentative perturba-
tions for each frame. The resulting transferred perturbations
Algorithm 1 Targeted V-BAD attack
Input: Top-1 probability P (y|x) with respect to classifier
f , target class yadv and video x
Output: Adversarial video xadv with ||xadv − x||∞ ≤ 
Parameters: Perturbation bound adv , epsilon decay ∆,
PGD step size α
← 1
xadv ← video of target class yadv
while  > adv do
v = 0
h = φ(xadv)
U = G(h)
vˆ = v +∇v`adv(xadv +R(v,U))
gˆ = R(vˆ,U)
ˆ← −∆
xˆadv ← CLIP(xadv − α · gˆ,x− ˆ,x+ ˆ)
if yadv = TOP-1(P (·|xˆadv)) then
xadv ← xˆadv
← ˆ
else
xˆadv ← CLIP(xadv − α · gˆ,x− ,x+ )
if yadv = TOP-1(P (·|xˆadv)) then
xadv ← xˆadv
end if
end if
end while
return xadv
can provide useful guidance for the exploration space and
help reduce the number of queries.
The tentative perturbations for an intermediate per-
turbed sample xt−1 can be extracted by:
φ(xt−1) = sign
(
∇xt−1 1N
N∑
n=1
‖bn ◦ f˜l(xt−1n )− bn ◦ rn‖22
)
, (7)
where sign(·) is the sign function, ◦ is the element-wise
product, ‖·‖22 is the squared L2-norm, N is the total number
of frames, f˜l(·) is the l-th layer output (e.g. deep features) of
a public image model f˜ , bn is a random mask on the n-th
frame, and rn is a target feature map which has the same
dimensions as f˜l(xt−1n ). φ(·) is to generate tentative pertur-
bations by minimizing the L2 distance between the feature
map f˜l(·) and a target (or adversarial) feature map rn. For
untargeted attack, rn is a feature map of Gaussian random
noise, while for targeted attack, rn is the feature map f˜l(x′n)
of the n-th frame of a video x′ from the target class yadv . The
random mask bn is a pixel-wise mask with each element is
randomly set to either 1 or 0. The use of random mask can
provide some randomness to the exploration of the attack
space and help avoid getting stuck in situations where the
frame-wise tentative perturbations are extremely inaccurate
to allow any effective rectification.
3.4 Partition-based Rectification
Tentative perturbations are transferred rough estimate of
the true adversarial gradient, thus it should be further
rectified to better approximate the true adversarial gradient.
To achieve this more efficiently, we propose to perform
5Algorithm 2 NES Estimation of Patch Rectification
Input: Adversarial loss `adv(x) with respect to input x
and tentative perturbation patches U
Output: Estimate of ∇v`adv(x+R(v,U))
Parameters: Search variance σ, sampling size λ
vˆ← 0M
for k = 1 to λ/2 do
δk ← N (0M , IM×M )
z2k−1 ← `adv(x+R(v + σδk,U))
vˆ← vˆ + δk · TransformedAdvLoss(z2k−1)
z2k ← `adv(x−R(v + σδk,U))
vˆ← vˆ − δk · TransformedAdvLoss(z2k)
end for
vˆ← 1λσ vˆ
return vˆ
rectifications at the patch-level (in contrast to pixel-level)
and use gradient estimation methods to estimate the proper
rectification weight for each patch. That is, we first partition
tentative perturbations into separate parts, which we call
perturbation patches, and then estimate the rectification
weights for these patches. In this subsection, we will in-
troduce the partitioning methods, rectification function, and
rectification weights estimation successively.
Partitioning Methods. We consider three types of parti-
tioning strategies (e.g. function G(·) in Eq. (3)). 1) Random:
dividing input dimensions randomly into a certain number
of patches. Note that the input dimensions within one patch
can be nonadjacent, although we refer to it as a patch.
Random partitioning does not consider the local correlations
between input dimensions but can be used as a baseline to
assess the effectiveness of carefully designed partitioning
methods. 2) Uniform: splitting a frame uniformly into a
certain number of patches. This will produce frame patches
that preserve local dimensional correlations. 3) Semantic:
partitioning the video input according to its semantic con-
tent. It is promising to explore the correlation between the
semantic content of the current input and its adversarial
gradient. In this paper, we empirically investigate the first
two partitioning strategies, i.e., Random and Uniform, and
leave semantic partitioning for future work.
Each patch constitutes a vector with the same number
of dimensions as the input by zero padding: assigning zero
values to dimensions that do not belong to the patch, while
keeping its values at dimensions that belong to the patch.
That is, for each patch, we have a vector u(m):
u
(m)
j =
{
hj if dimension j is in the m-th partition
0 otherwise.
Note that, u(m) has equal number of dimensions to both x
and h, namely, u(m) ∈ RN×H×W×C . We normalize the u(m)
to unit vector u(m) = u
(m)
|u(m)| (| · | is the vector norm), which
we call the direction vector of the m-th patch. The partition
function can be written as:
G(h) =
[
u(1),u(2), ...,u(M)
]
.
We denote the output of partition function as U = G(h).
Rectification Function. The rectification function
R(v,U) (in Eq. (4) and (5)) can be expressed as applying
the components of rectification vector v as weights to each
patch. Given a patch-wise rectification vector v (estimated
by some black-box gradient estimator), rectification is to
apply patch weights to the direction vectors of the patches:
R(v,U) =
[
u(1),u(2), ...,u(M)
]
v.
With the partition and rectification functions, we can
optimize the rectification weights v over patches instead of
all input dimensions. This effectively reduces the dimen-
sionality of the exploration space from N ×H ×W × C to
M .
Rectification Weights Estimation. For the estimation of
rectification weights for patches, we propose to use the
NES estimator which has been shown to be more efficient
than FD in black-box image attacks [19]. We will discuss
the efficiency of FD compared to NES in Section 4. In-
stead of maximizing the adversarial objective directly, NES
maximizes the expected value of the objective under a
search distribution. Different from [19] where the gradient
of adversarial loss with respect to the input is estimated, we
estimate the gradient with respect to the patch weights v.
For a adversarial loss function `adv(·), current parameters
v, x, U and a search distribution pi(γ|v), we have:
∇vEpi(γ|v)
[
`adv(x+R(γ,U))
]
=
Epi(γ|v)
[
`adv(x+R(γ,U))∇v log
(
pi(γ|v))].
Following [19], [37], [38], we use the normal distribution
as the search distribution, that is, γ = v + σδ where σ
is the search variance and δ ∼ N (0, I) (standard normal
distribution). We use antithetic sampling to generate a pop-
ulation of λ number of δk values: first sample Gaussian
noise for k ∈ {1, · · · , λ2 }, then set δk = −δλ−k+1 for
k ∈ {(λ2 + 1), · · · , λ}. Evaluating the gradient with a
population of λ points sampled under this scheme yields
the following gradient estimate:
∇vE
[
`adv(x+R(γ,U))
] ≈ 1
λσ
λ∑
k=1
δk`adv(x+R(v+σδk,U)).
Within each PGD perturbation step, v is initialized to all
zero values (see Eq. (1)) such that the starting point x +
R(v,U)) is centered at x.
The complete estimation algorithm for patch rectifi-
cation is described in Algorithm 2, where the function
TransformedAdvLoss(·) is a ranking-based nonlinear trans-
formation on the adversarial loss. The transformed loss in-
creases monotonically with the original adversarial loss [38],
except for targeted attack, it also “punishes” δk that fails to
maintain the target class as the top-1 class with the highest
loss value. With this estimated gradient for v, we can update
the rectification weights as vˆ = v+∇vE[`adv(x+R(γ,U))].
We then use vˆ to rectify tentative perturbations U to
R(vˆ,U), which allows us to apply one step of PGD per-
turbation following Eq. (6).
3.5 Analysis of V-BAD
We prove that patch-rectified perturbations is the estimation
of the projection of the adversarial gradient on a selected
subspace. Let S be the input space with respect to X , di-
rection vectors (e.g. u) of the tentative perturbation patches
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Fig. 3: Projection (gˆ) of gradient g on subspace ßu.
define a vector subspace ßu ⊆ S . Using the chain rule, we
can show that the gradients with respect to the patch-wise
rectification weights v are the directional derivatives of the
patch directions u evaluated at v = 0:
∂`adv(x+R(v,U))
∂vm
= (u(m))T∇x`adv(x) = ∂`adv(x)
∂u(m)
.
Suppose we have a perfect estimation of gradients with
regards to v, then the rectified perturbations become:
gˆ = R(vˆ,U) =
M∑
m=1
u(m) ·
(∂`adv(x)
∂u(m)
)
.
Since ∂`adv(x)
∂u(m)
is the directional derivative of u(m), u(m) ·
(∂`adv(x)
∂u(m)
) is the projection of adversarial gradient on the
direction u(m), if the model is differentiable. Thus, rectified
perturbations gˆ is the vector sum of the gradient projection
on each patch direction u(m). Therefore, rectified pertur-
bation gˆ can be regarded as the projection of adversarial
gradient g on subspace ßu, as the projection of a vector on a
subspace is the vector sum of the vector’s projections on the
orthogonal basis vectors of the subspace. Figure 3 illustrates
a toy example of the projection, where g is the adversarial
gradient, gˆ is the projection of g on a subspace ßu that is
defined by the direction vectors of two patches: u(1),u(2).
The main difference between our proposed patch-based
rectification and the direct estimation of adversarial gra-
dient over individual pixels is that patch rectification de-
couples the adversarial gradient estimation into two parts:
1) compressing the estimation space into subspaces ßu
defined by direction vectors of patches u, and 2) esti-
mating the directional derivatives of direction vectors (e.g.
∇v`adv(x+R(v,U))). In an extreme case, each input dimen-
sion (or pixel) is a patch, the rectified perturbations becomes
exactly the adversarial gradient, given perfect estimation of
∇v`adv(x + R(v,U)). In a typical case, patch rectification
is equivalent to estimating the projection of the adversarial
gradient on a subspace ßu. A beneficial property of the
projection gˆ is that it is the closest vector to the gradient in
subspace ßu having gˆ = arg minη(‖g − η‖2),∀η ∈ ßu ⊆ S .
This enables us to only consider the subspace ßu to find a
good estimation of the adversarial gradient g.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of
our proposed V-BAD framework and its variants, for both
untargeted and targeted video attacks on three benchmark
video datasets, against two state-of-the-art video recogni-
tion models. We also investigate different choices of ten-
tative perturbations, partitioning methods and estimation
methods in an ablation study.
4.1 Experimental Setting
Datasets. We consider three benchmark datasets for video
recognition: UCF-101 [39], HMDB-51 [40], and Kinetics-400
[41]. UCF-101 is an action recognition dataset of 13,320
realistic action videos, collected from YouTube. It consists of
101 action categories ranging from human-object/human-
interaction, body-motion, playing musical instruments to
sports. HMDB-51 is a dataset for human motion recogni-
tion, which contains 6849 clips from 51 action categories
including facial actions and body movements, with each
category containing a minimum of 101 clips. Kinetics-400 is
also a dataset for human action recognition, which consists
of approximately 240,000 video clips from 400 human action
classes with about 400 video clips (10 seconds) for each
class. At test time, we use 32-frame snippets for UCF-101
and HMDB-51, and 64-frame snippets for Kinetics-400, as it
has longer videos.
Video Recognition Models. We consider two state-of-
the-art video recognition models I3D and CNN+LSTM, as
our target models to attack. I3D is an inflated 3D con-
volutional network. We use a Kinetics-400 pretrained I3D
and finetune it on other two datasets. We sample frames
at 25 frames per second. CNN+LSTM is a combination of
the conventional 2D convolutional network and the LSTM
network. For CNN+LSTM we use a ImageNet pretrained
ResNet101 as a frame feature extractor, then finetune a
LSTM built on it. Input video frames are subsampled by
keeping one out of every 5 for CNN+LSTM Model. Note we
only consider the RGB part for both video models. The test
accuracy of the two models can be found in Table 1. The
accuracy gap between ours and the one reported in [3] is
mainly caused by the availability of fewer input frames at
test time.
Image Models. We use ImageNet [25] pretrained deep
networks as our image model for the generation of the
tentative perturbations. ImageNet is an image dataset that
contains more than 10 million natural images from more
than 1000 classes. Given the difference between our video
datasets and ImageNet, rather than using one model, we
chose an ensemble of ImageNet models as our image model:
ResNet50 [42], DenseNet121 [43], and DenseNet169 [43].
Attack Setting. For each dataset, we randomly select one
test video, from each category, that is correctly classified by
the target model. We randomly choose a target class for
each video in targeted attack. For all datasets, we set the
maximum adversarial perturbations magnitude to  = 0.05
per frame. The query limit, i.e., the maximum number of
queries to the target model is set to Q = 3 × 105, which is
similar to the number of queries required for most black-box
image attacks to succeed. We run the attack until an adver-
sarial example is found (attack succeeds) or we reach the
query limit. We evaluate different attack strategies in terms
of 1) success rate (SR), the ratio of successful generation of
adversarial examples under the perturbations bound within
7TABLE 1: Test Accuracy (%) of the video models.
Model UCF-101 HMDB-51 Kinetics-400
I3D 91.30 63.73 64.71
CNN+LSTM 76.29 44.38 53.20
TABLE 2: Results for V-BAD with different: 1) tentative
perturbations, 2) partitioning methods, and 3) estimation
methods. Symbol “+” indicates fixed methods for untested
components of V-BAD. Best results are highlighted in bold.
ANQ: average number of queries; SR: success rate.
Components of V-BAD Method UCF-101ANQ SR (%)
Tentative Perturbations
+ partition: Uniform
+ estimation: NES
Static 51786 70
Random 107499 95
Single 57361 100
Ensemble 49797 100
Partitioning Method
+ tentative: Ensemble
+ estimation: NES
Random 77881 100
Uniform 49797 100
Estimation Method
+ tentative: Ensemble
+ partition: Uniform
FD 61585 70
NES 49797 100
the limit of number of queries; and 2) average number of
queries (ANQ), required for a successful attack (excluding
failed attacks).
V-BAD Setting. For tentative perturbations, we average
the perturbations extracted from the three image models
to obtain the final perturbations. For partitioning, we use
uniform partitioning to get 8× 8 patches per frame and set
the NES population size of each estimation as 48, which
works consistently well across different datasets in terms of
both success rate and number of queries. For search variance
σ in NES, we set it to 10−6 for the targeted attack setting
and 10−3 for the untargeted attack setting. This is because
a targeted attack needs to keep the target class in the top-1
class list to get the score of the targeted class, while the aim
of an untargeted attack is to remove the current class from
top-1 class position, which allows a large search step. We use
PGD attack for step-wise perturbations with dynamically
chosen step size. For the targeted attack, we adjust the step
size α and epsilon decay ∆ dynamically. If the ratio of
failing to maintain the adversarial class is higher than a
threshold of 50%, we halve the step size α. If we fail to
reduce the perturbations size  after 100 times, we halve the
epsilon decay ∆.
4.2 Ablation Study of V-BAD
In this section, we evaluate variants of V-BAD, with different
types of 1) tentative perturbations, 2) partitioning methods
and 3) estimation methods. Experiments were conducted on
a subset of 20 randomly selected categories from UCF-101
dataset.
Tentative Perturbations. We first evaluate V-BAD with
the three different types of tentative perturbations discussed
in Section 3.3: 1) Random, 2) Static, and 3) Transferred. For
transferred, we test two different strategies, with either a
single image model ResNet-50 (denoted as “Single”) or an
TABLE 3: Targeted attacks on UCF-101/HMDB-51/Kinetics-
400 against I3D/CNN+LSTM models. Best results are in
bold.
Target
Model Attack
UCF-101 HMDB-51 Kinetics-400
ANQ SR (%) ANQ SR (%) ANQ SR (%)
I3D
SR-BAD 67909 96.0 40824 96.1 63761 98.0
P-BAD 104986 96.0 62744 96.8 84380 97.0
V-BAD 60687 98.0 34260 96.8 54528 100.0
CNN
+
LSTM
SR-BAD 147322 45.5 67037 82.4 109314 73.0
P-BAD 159723 60.4 72697 90.2 117368 85.0
V-BAD 84294 93.1 44944 98.0 70897 97.0
TABLE 4: Untargeted attacks on UCF-101/HMDB-
51/Kinetics-400 against I3D/CNN+LSTM models. Best re-
sults are in bold.
Target
Model Attack
UCF-101 HMDB-51 Kinetics-400
ANQ SR (%) ANQ SR (%) ANQ SR (%)
I3D
SR-BAD 5143 98.0 1863 100.0 1496 100.0
P-BAD 11571 98.0 4162 100.0 3167 100.0
V-BAD 3642 100.0 1152 100.0 1012 100.0
CNN
+
LSTM
SR-BAD 8674 100.0 684 100.0 1181 100.0
P-BAD 12628 100.0 1013 100.0 1480 100.0
V-BAD 784 100.0 197 100.0 293 100.0
ensemble of the three considered image models (denoted as
“Ensemble”). The partitioning and estimation methods were
set to Uniform and NES respectively. The results in terms of
success rate (SR) and average number of queries (ANQ) can
be found in Table 2. A clear improvement can be observed
for the use of transferred tentative perturbations compared
to static or random perturbations. The number of queries
required for successful attacks was dramatically reduced
from more than 105 to less than 6×104 by using only a single
image model. This confirms that an image model alone can
provide effective guidance for attacking video models. The
number was further reduced to around 5×104 via the use of
an ensemble of three image models. Compared to random
perturbations, static perturbations require fewer queries to
succeed, with 50% less queries due to the reduced explo-
ration space. However, static perturbations have a much
lower success rate (70%) than random perturbations (95%).
This indicates that fixed directions can generate adversarial
examples faster with restricted exploration space, however,
such restrictions may cause the attack easily stuck in some
local optima, without the exploration over other directions
that could lead to potentially more powerful attacks.
Partitioning Methods. In this experiment, we investigate
the two types of partitioning methods introduced in Section
3.4, namely, Random and Uniform. For tentative perturba-
tions, we use the best method found in the previous experi-
ments - Ensemble. Results are reported in Table 2. As can be
seen, both partitioning methods can find successful attacks,
but the use of uniform partitioning significantly reduces the
number of queries by 36%, to around 5 × 104 from 8 × 104
of random partitioning. This is because a tentative pertur-
bations generated from image models often contains certain
local patterns, but random partitioning tends to destroy
such locality. Recall that partitioning is applied in every
step of perturbations, and as such, uniform partitioning
8can help to maintain stable and consistent patches across
different iteration steps. This allows the rectification to make
continuous corrections to the same local patches.
Estimation Methods. As we mentioned in Section 3.4,
any derivative-free (or black-box) optimization methods can
be used to estimate the rectification weights. Here, we com-
pare two of the methods that have been used for black-box
image attacks: FD (Finite Difference) [18] and NES (Natural
Evolution Strategies) [19]. For a fair comparison, we made
some adjustments to the number of patches used by the FD
estimator, so that FD and NES require a similar number of
queries per update. The results are reported in Table 2. NES
demonstrates a clear advantage over FD: FD only achieves
70% success rate within the query limit (e.g. 3× 105), while
NES has a 100% success rate. And the number of queries
required by successful NES attacks is roughly 20% less than
that of FD attacks.
Based on the ablation results, in the following experi-
ments, we set the V-BAD to: ensemble tentative perturba-
tions, uniform partitioning and NES rectification estimator.
4.3 Comparison to Existing Attacks
In this section, we compare our V-BAD framework with
two existing state-of-the-art black-box image attack methods
[18], [19]. Instead of directly applying the two image attack
methods to videos, we instead incorporate their logic into
our V-BAD framework to obtain two variants of V-BAD.
Baselines. The first baseline method is the pixel-wise
adversarial gradient estimation using NES, proposed in
[19]. This can be easily achieved by using static tentative
perturbations and setting the patches in V-BAD to pixels,
i.e., each pixel is a patch. We denote this baseline variant of
V-BAD by P-BAD. The NES population size for P-BAD is set
as 96, since there are many more parameters to estimate. The
second baseline method is grouping-based adversarial gra-
dient estimation using FD, proposed by [18]. This method
explores random partitioning to reduce the large number
of queries required by FD. Accordingly, we use the variant
of V-BAD that utilizes static tentative perturbations and
random partitioning, and denote it by SR-BAD. Different
from its original setting with FD, here we use NES for
SR-BAD which was found more efficient in our previous
experiments. It is worth mentioning that a dimensionality
reduction technique (e.g. PCA) was also explored in [18]
to project inputs to low dimensional features. Although it
increased attack success rate on simple black-white images
(e.g. MNIST [44]), it did not help attacks on natural images
(e.g. CIFAR10 [24]), due to the information loss caused by
the projection.
Targeted Black-box Video Attack. Comparison results
for targeted attacks are reported in Table 3. Among the three
methods, V-BAD achieves the best success rates, consis-
tently using least number of queries across the three datasets
and two recognition models. Specifically, V-BAD only takes
(3.4 ∼ 8.4)× 104 queries to achieve a success rate of above
93%. Note that this is comparable to state-of-the-art black-
box image attacks [19]. Comparing P-BAD and V-BAD,
pixel-wise estimation by P-BAD does not seem to yield more
effective attacks, whereas on the contrary, patition-based
rectifications by V-BAD not only reduces∼ 50% queries, but
TABLE 5: Cosine similarity between varies tentative or
rectified gradients and the actual gradient.
Tentative Static Random Transferred
Cosine 7.177× 10−5 −1.821× 10−5 −2.743× 10−4
Rectified SR-BAD P-BAD V-BAD
Cosine 3.480× 10−3 3.029× 10−3 4.661× 10−3
also leads to more successful attacks. Compare the perfor-
mance on different target models, an obvious degradation
of performance can be observed on CNN+LSTM model.
This is because CNN+SLTM has a lower accuracy than
I3D, making it relatively robust to targeted attacks (not for
untargeted attacks), an observation that is consistent with
findings in [45]. However, this impact is the least significant
on V-BAD where the accuracy decreases less than 5%, while
the accuracy of P-BAD and SR-BAD has a huge drop,
especially on UCF-101(from 96.0% to 45.5%). This is further
illustrated in Figure 4, showing change in success rate with
the number of queries. This can probably be explained
by the better transferability of transferred tentative pertur-
bations on CNN+LSTM than I3D due to the similar 2D
CNN used in CNN+LSTM video model. As in Figure 4, the
advantage of better transferability even overcomes the low
accuracy drawback of CNN+LSTM on HMDB-51 dataset: V-
BAD/CNN+LSTM is above V-BAD/I3D for the first 4×104
queries. A targeted video adversarial examples generated
by V-BAD is illustrated in Figure 1, where video on the top
is the original video with the correct class and video at the
bottom is the video adversarial example misclassified as the
adversarial class.
Untargeted Black-box Video Attack. Results for untar-
geted attacks are reported in Table 4. Compared to targeted
attacks, untargeted attacks are much easier to achieve, re-
quiring only ∼ 10% queries of targeted attacks. Compared
to other baselines, V-BAD is the most effective and efficient
attack across all datasets and recognition models. It only
takes a few hundred queries for V-BAD to completely break
the CNN+LSTM model.
Both attacks indicate that video models are as vulnerable
as image models to black-box adversarial attacks. This has
serious implications for the video recognition community to
consider.
4.4 Gradient Estimate Quality
We further explore the quality of various tentative pertur-
bations and rectified perturbations generated by different
variants of V-BAD. We measure the perturbations quality
by calculating the cosine similarity between the ground-
truth adversarial gradient and the tentative/rectified per-
turbations. The results are based on 20 random runs of the
attacks on 50 videos randomly chosen from UCF-101, and
are reported in Table 5. Consistent with the comparison
experiments, V-BAD generates the best gradient estimates
and P-BAD has the worst estimation quality. All the rectified
perturbations are much better than the tentative perturba-
tions. This verifies that tentative perturbations can be sig-
nificantly improved by proper rectification. One interesting
observation is that the transferred tentative perturbations
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Fig. 4: Comparative results for targeted attack.
(from an ensemble of ImageNet models) have a large nega-
tive cosine similarity, which is opposite to our design. One
explanation could be that there is a huge gap between the
image model and the video model. However, note that while
the transferred perturbations is opposite to the gradient, it
serves as a good initialization and yields better gradient
estimation after rectification. It is noteworthy that there
is still a considerable gap between the gradient estimate
and the actual gradient. From one angle, it reflects that we
do not need very accurate gradient estimation to generate
adversarial examples. From another angle, it suggests that
black-box attack based on gradient estimation has great
scope for further improvement.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of black-box
adversarial attack against video recognition models, and
proposed the first framework, V-BAD, for the generation of
video adversarial examples through only black-box queries
to a video model. To address efficiency issues caused by the
high dimensionality of videos, we decoupled adversarial
gradient estimation into a two-step process: tentative per-
turbations transfer followed by partition-based rectification
with NES estimation method. We demonstrated the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of V-BAD by attacking two state-
of-the-art video recognition models on three benchmark
video datasets. Compared to existing black-box methods,
V-BAD achieved high success rate using significantly less
queries for both targeted and untargeted attacks. Our results
suggest that video models are also highly vulnerable to
black-box adversarial attacks, and that effective defenses for
video models will need to be developed for secure video
recognition.
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